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Abstract. Flow-based intrusion detection will play an important role
in high-speed networks, due to the stringent performance requirements
of packet-based solutions. Flow monitoring technologies, such as Net-
Flow or IPFIX, aggregate individual packets into flows, requiring new
intrusion detection algorithms to deal with the aggregated data. These
algorithms are subject to constraints on real-time and accurate detection
of intrusions, due to the nature of current flow monitoring technologies.
In this paper, we propose a framework for flow-based intrusion detec-
tion, aiming to detect intrusions in real-time, and to be resilient against
negative effects of attacks on monitoring systems. This research is still
in its initial phase and will contribute to a Ph.D. thesis after four years.
1 Introduction
Monitoring high-speed networks is a crucial and challenging task. Packet-level
monitoring technologies became almost unfeasible, due to limited processing
power and storage capacity on monitoring systems. Especially for monitoring
links with line speeds of 10 Gbps and higher, scalable monitoring technologies are
inevitable. Flow monitoring technologies, such as Cisco’s NetFlow [1] or IPFIX
[2], were designed for this purpose, and are widely deployed in routers, switches
and dedicated probes. Following this trend, security analysis applications should
evolve from packet-based to flow-based solutions [3]. Research has already been
performed on flow-based anomaly detection in past years, such as in [4–6].
Besides line speeds and available bandwidth, also the size and frequency of
attacks are increasing. When these attacks target monitoring systems (either
directly or indirectly), these systems - as well as the associated data - will be af-
fected [7]. For the specific case of flow monitoring, this applies to flow Exporters
and Collectors, which represent the flow data export and collection processes, re-
spectively. Exporters account traffic statistics by aggregating packets that share
certain properties, known as the flow key1. Thereafter, this aggregated flow data
is sent to flow Collectors for persistent storage and analysis.
1 A commonly used flow key consists of source/destination IP addresses and port num-
bers, transport-layer protocol, IP Type of Service (ToS) and SNMP input interface.
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In order for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to be reliable, detection should
be done as accurate and early as possible. However, due to the design of current
flow monitoring technologies, flow-based monitoring systems are subject to the
following problems:
1. Exporters send flow records to Collectors after expiration. Several expira-
tion rules can be implemented [1, 8], but timeout-based expiration rules are
required. As a consequence, data analysis applications, which retrieve flow
data from a Collector, always receive the data after a certain delay. Besides
that, many Collectors make the stored flow data only available after a certain
time interval, which should also be added to the total incurred delay.
2. When an Exporter is monitoring an ongoing attack, it might become over-
loaded and start to behave differently [7]. Collectors might start to experi-
ence problems as well, because of the immense amount of flow records they
need to process (e.g. for filtering, compressing and generating statistics) as
part of an attack, for example.
To overcome these delay and performance issues, a scalable and resilient
solution is needed for detecting and regulating (i.e. to avoid overloading the
equipment) attack traffic for analysis by IDSs. We believe it to be a promising
approach to move a part of the intrusion detection logic to the Exporter, such
that detection algorithms are not subject to delays during the flow export. Be-
sides that, Exporters and Collectors should share their knowledge about ongoing
anomalies, in order to take countermeasures against overload as a consequence
of an attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will discuss
the research questions for this work, followed by a description of the proposed
approach in Section 3. After that, we conclude and close this paper in Section 4.
2 Research Questions
The goal of this research is to design a scalable framework for real-time
and resilient intrusion detection. A flow-based approach will be chosen in
order to satisfy the requirement of scalability. In the remainder of this paper, we
refer to this goal as the framework. To conduct the research presented above, we
define the following research questions:
1. What are the implications for flow monitoring architectures when intrusion
detection needs to be done in real-time?
2. How can scalability of flow-based IDSs be improved, in order to make these
systems resilient against attacks?
3. How can requirements for real-time and resilient intrusion detection be mod-
eled in a framework?
The approach used for answering each of these research questions will be
discussed in the next section.
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Fig. 1. Flow-based framework for real-time and resilient intrusion detection
3 Approach
Research question 1, as presented in the previous section, aims to get a thorough
understanding of performance bottlenecks in current Exporters and Collectors,
which prevent these systems from serving flow data to IDSs in real-time. A real-
time intrusion detection framework might require some architectural changes to
flow monitoring systems, as anomaly detection should be done as close as possible
to the flow Exporter (i.e. the measurement point). This study will be performed
by conducting a literature study, combined with real-world measurements.
The goal of research question 2 is to investigate how scalability of flow-based
IDSs can be improved. A naive approach would be to increase the sampling rate
in various stages of the analysis process, for decreasing the load of the involved
systems. Also flow expiration timeouts could be increased for the same purpose.
Although both changes will result in a higher flow record aggregation, the quality
and usefulness of the flow data for intrusion detection will be negatively impacted
[9, 10]. Hence, a tradeoff should be made between 1) flow data quality and 2)
scalability of the framework, which will be covered by research question 2.
By means of research question 3, we will propose a framework for flow-based
intrusion detection, in which the knowledge obtained in the previous research
questions will be incorporated. Nowadays, a single, one-directional data stream
is used between Exporters and Collectors, by means of which flow records are
transferred. Our aim is to enrich this architecture with the following comple-
mentary data streams, as depicted in Figure 1:
1. Exporter to Collector. After moving a part of the intrusion detection logic
to the Exporter, detected anomalies should be shared with the Collector.
2. Collector to Exporter. Intrusions detected by the Collector should be shared
with the Exporter. Both the Collector and the analysis application can in-
struct the Exporter to adjust the data export process. This can be done for
several reasons, such as performance constraints during ongoing attacks. Fi-
nally, the Collector sends status information about its available processing
capacity, to which the Exporter can adapt the NetFlow/IPFIX data stream.
3. Exporter to Exporter. The Exporter should monitor its own available pro-
cessing capacity and change the data granularity accordingly, in order to
stabilize its load.
After proposing the framework, its correctness and applicability will be val-
idated by implementing a proof-of-concept. The result will be validated against
a ground truth in a lab environment. After that, the accuracy and resilience
of the proposed solution will be verified in a backbone network, such as the
SURFnet [11] network.
4 Final Considerations
When flow-based technologies are used in an intrusion detection context, flow
data should be accurate and the infrastructure resilient. The nature of these tech-
nologies, however, poses constraints on these requirements. This Ph.D. research
aims to design a framework that should satisfy the requirements on flow-based
IDSs. The main goal of this work, as described before, should be achieved within
a period of four years, as part of a Ph.D thesis.
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